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Abstract
In this paper we develop an approach to measuring inequality and
poverty that recognizes the fact that individuals within households may
have both di¤erent preferences and di¤erential access to resources. We
argue that a measure based on estimates of the sharing rule is inadequate
as an approach that seeks to understand how welfare is distributed in
the population because it ignores public good and the allocation of time
to market work, leisure and household production. We develop a money
metric measure of welfare that accounts for public goods (by using per-
sonalized prices) household production and for the allocation of time.
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1 Introduction: individual and household wel-
fare
When dealing with households, the applied welfare literature is faced with an
interesting conundrum. On the one hand, what we are (or should be) ulti-
mately interested in is individual welfare. Household welfare, if this notion has
any sense, cannot be dened without considering the welfare of each member.
On the other hand, most empirical measures of welfare stop at the household
level. That could have been acceptable if the two approaches were equivalent -
say, if there existed a stable, monotonic, one-to-one relationship between house-
hold welfare, as measured by the standard approaches, and the welfare of each
individual composing the household, so that any reform improving total wel-
fare would automatically improve that of each member in similar proportion.
However, everything we know about household behavior strongly suggests that
such an assumption would be plain wrong. From a theoretical perspective, it
would imply that poweris either distributed across household members in a
totally inexible manner, regardless of individual situations, or is irrelevant to
intrahousehold allocation of welfare. While both arguments can be found in
the literature (the rst is reminiscent of Samuelsons household welfare index,
whereas the second relates to Beckers rotten kid theorem), advances in family
economics over the last two decades have essentially been build upon the oppo-
site view - i.e., that intrahousehold allocation of power is crucial for individual
welfare, and responds to changes in the environment. From an empirical per-
spective, moreover, the verdict is clear. Income pooling - a central prediction of
the previous approaches - has been systematically rejected; there is ample evi-
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dence that reforms which alter the balance of power within the household (e.g.,
by paying a benet to the wife instead of the husband) do impact household
behavior and individual well-being.
Analyzing welfare at the intrahousehold level, however, raises a host of spe-
cic problems. An obvious di¢ culty is observability. While many data sets
report aggregate consumption at the household level, individual consumptions
are typically not recorded, at least for most commodities; they have to be re-
covered. But conceptual problems at least as challenging. A large fraction of
household expenditures relate to public commodities - i.e., goods that are jointly
consumed by the household, without anyone being excluded; moreover, in many
cases these public commodities are internally produced within the household.
Spouses may have di¤erent preferences regarding public goods; therefore, the
fraction of household expenditures devoted to public consumption has a poten-
tially important (and di¤erentiated) impact on individual welfare that cannot
be ignored. Similar questions arise for intrahousehold production, with the ad-
ditional twist that time spent by each spouse should also be taken into account.
How should such public productions and consumptions be considered? Can
one dene a money-metric measure of individual welfare that accounts for the
public nature of several consumption goods (and their potentially di¤erentiated
impact of the welfare of each individual)? And when would such a measure be
empirically identiable from standard data on household behavior?
The aim of the present article is to provide a new answer to these ques-
tions. Obviously, this task rst requires an explicit model of household decision
making that recognizes the existence of (potentially di¤erent) individual pref-
erences and claries the notion of powerwithin the household. Furthermore,
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these goals should be achieved in an empirically tractable way. An acceptable
approach must fulll a double requirement: testability (i.e., it should generate
a set of empirically testable restrictions that fully characterize the model, in
the sense that any given behavior is compatible with the model if and only if
these conditions are satised) and identiability (it should be feasible, possibly
under additional assumption, to recover the structure of the model in our case,
individual preferences and welfare) from the sole observation of household be-
havior. The main candidate, in this respect, is the collective approach.1 While
other (non-unitary) perspectives have been adopted in the literature, none of
the alternatives has (so far) convincingly addressed the double requirement of
testability and identiability just evoked.
The basic axiom of the collective approach is Pareto e¢ ciency: whatever de-
cision the household is making, no alternative choice would have been preferred
by all members. While this assumption is undoubtedly restrictive, its scope
remains quite large. It encompasses as particular cases many models that have
been proposed in the literature, including:
 unitary models, which posit that the household behaves like a single
decision maker; this includes simple dictatorship (possibly by a benevolent
patriarch, as in Becker, 1974) to the existence of some household welfare
function (as in Samuelson 1956),
 models based on cooperative game theory, and particularly bargaining
theory (at least in a context of symmetric information), as pioneered by
Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981),
1For a more detailed presentation, the reader is referred to Browning, Chiappori and Weiss
(2013)
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 model based on market equilibrium, as analyzed by Grossbard-Shechtman
(1993), Gersbach and Haller (2001), Edlund, and Korn (2002) and others.
 more specic models, such as Lundberg and Pollaks separate spheres
framework.2
Over the last decades, the collective model has been fully characterized. We
now have a set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a demand function to
stem from a collective framework (Chiappori, Ekeland 2006); and exclusion re-
strictions have been derived under which individual preferences and the decision
process (as summarized by the Pareto weights) can be recovered from the sole
observation of household behavior (Chiappori, Ekeland 2009a). To the best of
our knowledge, this is the only model of the household for which such results
have been derived.3
The next section describes the basic model. We then discuss the conceptual
issues linked with intrahousehold inequality, rst in the case where all com-
modities are privately consumed, then in the presence of public goods. In the
following section, we consider extensions of the model to encompass individual-
specic prices and domestic production. Finally, we discuss issues related to
identication.
2On the other hand, the collective framework excludes models based on non cooperative
game theory (at least in the presence of public good), such as those considered by Ulph (2006),
Lechene and Preston (2009), Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2009) and many others, as
well as models of ine¢ cient bargaining a la Basu (2006).
3Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2009) and Lechene and Preston (2009) provide a set
of necessary conditions for non cooperative models. However, whether these conditions are
su¢ cient is not known; moreover, no general identication result has been derived so far.
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2 Concepts, denitions, axioms
In what follows, we consider a K-person household that can consume several
commodities; these include standard consumption goods and services, but also
leisure, future or contingent goods, etc. Formally, N of these commodities are
publicly consumed within the houshold. The market purchase of public good j
is denoted Qj ; the N -vector of public goods is given by Q. Similarly, private
goods are denoted qi with the n-vector q. Each private goods bought is divided
between the members so that member a (a = 1; :::;K) receives qai of good i, withP
a q
a





An allocation is a N +Kn-vector
 
Q; q1; :::; qK

. The associated market prices
are given by the N -vector P and the n-vector p for public and private goods
respectively.
We assume that each married person has her or his own preferences over
the allocation of family resources. The most general version of the model would
consider utilities of the form Ua
 
Q; q1; :::; qK

, implying that a is concerned
directly with all membersconsumptions. Here, however, tractability requires
additional structure. In what follows, we therefore assume that preferences are
of the caring type. That is, each individual a has a felicity function ua (Q; qa);
and as utlity takes the form:
Ua
 













where W a (:; :) is an increasing function. The weak separability of these social





that b consumes whenever b is indi¤erent. In this sense caring
is distinguished from paternalism. Caring rules out direct externalities between
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members because as evaluation of her private consumption qa does not depend
directly on the private goods that b consumes.
Lastly, a particular but widely used version of caring is egotistic preferences,
whereby members only care about their own (private and public) consumption;
then individual preferences can be represented by felicities (i.e., utilities of the
form ua (Q; qa)).4 Note that such egotistic preferences for consumption do not
exclude non economic aspects, such as love, companionship or others. That is, a
persons utility may be a¤ected by the presence of other persons, but not by their
consumption. Technically, the truepreferences are of the form F a (ua (Q; qa)),
where F a may depend on marital status and on the spouses characteristics.
Note that the F as will typically play a crucial role in the decision to marry and
in the choice of a partner. However, it is irrelevant for the characterization of
individual preferences over consumption bundles.
E¢ ciency has a simple translation - namely, the household behaves as if it
was maximizing a weighted sum of utilities of its members. Technically, the





aua (Q; qa) ((P))












= y1 + :::+ yK = y
where ya denotes as (non labor) income. Here, a is the Pareto weight of
member a; one may, for instance, adopt the normalization
P
a 
a = 1. In
the particular case where a is constant, the program above describes a uni-
tary model, since household behavior is described by the maximization of some
4Throughout the chapter, we assume, for convenience, that utility functions Us (:), s = a; b
are continuously di¤erentiable and strictly quasi-concave.
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(price independent) utility. In general, however, a may vary with prices and
individual incomes; the maximand in (P) is therefore price-dependent, and we
are not in a unitary framework in general.
This program can readily be extended to caring preferences - one must simply










in (P). In what follows,
however, (P) plays a very special role, mostly because of the following result:
Proposition 1 Assume that some allocation is Pareto-e¢ cient for the caring





Proof. Assume not, then there exists an alternative allocation that gives a
larger value to ua for all a = 1; :::;K. But then that allocation also gives a
higher value to all W as, a contradiction.
In words: any allocation that is e¢ cient for caring preferences must be ef-
cient for the underlying, egotistic felicities. The converse is not true, because
a very unequal solution to (P) may fail to be Pareto e¢ cient for caring prefer-
ences: transfering resources from well endowed but caring individuals to poorly
endowed ones may be Pareto improving. We conclude that any property of the
solutions to a program of the form (P) must be satised by any Pareto-e¢ cient
allocation with caring preferences.
A major advantage of the formulation (P) is that the Pareto weights have
a natural interpretation in terms of respective decision powers. The notion of
power in households may be di¢ cult to dene formally, even in a simplied
framework like ours. Still, it seems natural to expect that when two people
bargain, a persons gain increases with the persons power. This somewhat
hazy notion is captured very e¤ectively by the Pareto weights. Clearly, if a in
(P) is zero then a has no say on the nal allocation, while if a is large (close
to 1 in our normalization) then a e¤ectively gets her way. A key property of
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(P) is precisely that increasing  will result in a move along the Pareto set,
in the direction of higher utility for a. If we restrict ourselves to economic
considerations, we may thus consider that the Pareto weight a reectsas
power, in the sense that a larger a corresponds to more power (and better
outcomes) being enjoyed by a.
If
 
Q (p; P; y) ; q1 (p; P; y) ; :::; qK (p; P; y)

denotes the solution to (P), we
dene the collective indirect utlity of a as the utility reached by a at the end of
the decision process; formally:
V a (p; P; y) = ua
 
Q (p; P; y) ; qa (p; P; y)

Note that, unlike the unitary setting, in the collective framework a members
collective indirect utility depends not only on the members preferences but also
on the decision process (hence the adjective collective). This notion is crucial
for welfare analysis, as we shall see below.
Finally, an important concept is the notion of distribution factors. A distri-
bution factor is any variable that (i) does not a¤ect preferences or the budget
constraint, but (ii) may inuence the decision process, therefore the Pareto
weights. Think, for instance, of a bargaining model in which the agentsrespec-
tive threat points may vary. A change in the threat point of one member will
typically inuence the outcome of the bargaining process, even if the households
budget constraint is una¤ected. In particular, several works use individual (non




is the vector of individual
incomes and y =
P
a y
a, while total income y is not a distribution factor (it
enters the budget constraints), the (K   1) ratios y1=y; :::; yK 1=y are.5
5 In practice, distribution factors must be uncorrelated with preferences, which, in the case
of individual incomes, can generate subtle exogeneity problems. See Browning, Chiappori and
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In what follows, the vector of distribution factors will be denoted z =
(z1; :::; zS); Pareto weights and collective indirect utilities, therefore, have the
general form a (p; P; y; z) and V a (p; P; y; z).
3 Intrahousehold welfare: basic issues
We now consider individual welfare issues. We rst consider a special case in
which all commodities are privately consumed, then move to the general case.
3.1 The case of private goods
When all commodities are privately consumed, the household can be considered
as a small economy without externalities or public goods. From the second
welfare theorem, any Pareto e¢ cient allocation can be decentralized by adequate
transfers. Formally, we have the following result:




is Pareto e¢ cient. Then

























k k (p; y; z) =
y, an allocation that solves (D) for all a is Pareto-e¢ cient.
In words: in a private goods setting, any e¢ cient decision can be described
as (or as if) a two-stage process. In the rst stage, agents jointly decide on the
Weiss (2013) for a detailed discussion.
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allocation of household aggregate income y between agents (and agent a gets
a); in stage two, agents freely spend the share they have received. The decision
process (bargaining, for instance) takes place in the rst stage; its outcome is




, which are called the sharing rule of the
household.
From a welfare perspective, the crucial point is that there exists a one-to-
one, increasing corespondance between Pareto weights and the sharing rule,
at least when the Pareto set is strictly convex. When prices and incomes are
constant, increasing the weight of one individual (reducing the other weights
proportionally in order to maintain the normalization) always results in a larger
share for that individual and conversely. The collective, indirect utility of agent
a takes a simple form, namely:
V a (p; y) = va (p; a (p; y))
where va is the standard, indirect utility of agent a. In particular, we have the
following result:
Proposition 3 When all commodities are privately consumed, then for any
given price vector there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the sharing
rule and the indirect utility
This result has two consequences. First, given each persons preferences, the
sharing rule is a su¢ cient statistic for the entire decision process. Indeed, since
all agents face the same prices, the sharing rule fully summarizes intrahouse-
hold allocation of resources. As such, it is directly relevant for intrahousehold
inequality. Second, and more importantly for our present purpose, the sharing
rule is a money metric measure of individual utility. For given prices, a is an
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increasing transform of the collective indirect utility of person a; moreover, and
unlike V a, it is measured in dollars.
3.2 Public and private commodities
Convenient as the previous notions may be, they still rely on a strong assumption
- namely that all commodities are privately consumed. Relaxing this assumption
is obviously necessary, if only because the existence of public consumption is
one of the motives of household formation. We shall successively consider three
possible extensions of the previous notion to the case of public goods.
3.2.1 Conditional sharing rule
A rst generalization of the notion of sharing rule, the conditional sharing rule,
is based on the following result:
Proposition 4 Assume an allocation
 
Q; q1; :::; qK

is Pareto e¢ cient. Then








k (p; P; y; z) = y  
P
j Pj
Qj, such that for all a




























Q; q1; :::; q̂a; :::; qK

is feasible and Pareto dominates 
Q; q1; :::; qK

, a contradiction.




constitute the conditional sharing rule of the
household. The interpretation, again, is in terms of a two-stage process. In
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stage one, the household decides the consumption of public goods and the dis-
tribution of remaining income between members; in stage two, members all
spend their alloted amount on private consumption, so as to maximize individ-
ual utility conditional on the level of public consumption decided in stage 1.
The conditional indirect utility is thus:
~V a (p;Q; ) = max
qa
fua (Q; qa) s.t. p:qa = g
While the conditional sharing rule (CSR) is indeed a generalization of the
sharing rule, three points must be noted. First, the existence of a conditional
sharing rule is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for e¢ ciency; that is,
for any given level of public consumption, it is in general the case that almost
all conditional sharing rules lead to ine¢ cient allocations. Specically, a con-
ditional sharing rule is compatible with e¢ ciency if and only if the standard,
Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson conditions, which express the optimality of Q for
these preferences, are satised:
X
a
@ ~V a (p;Q; a) =@Qj
@ ~V a (p;Q; a) =@a
= Pj ; j = 1; :::; N
Second, the monotonic relationship between sharing rule and Pareto weights
is lost. In particular, increasing as weight does not necessarily result in a larger
value for a. The intuition, here, is that giving more weight to one agent may
result in a di¤erent allocation of public expenditures, which may or may not
result in an increase in the agents private consumption. In that sense, the
generalization is only partial.
Third, and more importantly for our purpose, the conditional sharing rule
may give a biased estimate of intrahousehold welfare allocation, because it sim-
ply disregards public consumption. That this pattern could be problematic is
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easy to see. Assume that one spouse (say the wife) cares a lot for a public
good, while her husband cares very little. If the structure of household demand
entails a signicant fraction of expenditures being devoted to that public good,
one can expect this pattern to have an impact on any welfare measure within
the household. Disregarding public consumption altogether is therefore not an
adequate approach.
3.2.2 Public goods and Lindahl prices
An alternative approach to public consumption relies on the notion of Lindahl
prices. An old result in public economics states that, in the presence of public
goods, Pareto e¢ cient allocations can be decentralized using personal prices that
add up to the market price of the commodity. Formally, we have the following
result:
Proposition 5 Assume an allocation
 
Q; q1; :::; qK

is Pareto e¢ cient. Then












; a = 1; :::;K; j = 1; :::; N (where P a is as vector










ua (Q; qa) (DP)




























j = Pj for all j, an allocation that solves (DP) for all
a is Pareto-e¢ cient.




denes a generalized sharing rule (GSR).
From an inequality perspective, this notion raises interesting issues. One could
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choose to adopt  as a description of intrahousehold welfare allocation; indeed,
agents now maximize utility under a budget constraint in which  describes
available income. In particular,  is a much better indicator of the distribution
of resources than the conditional sharing rule ~, because it takes into account
both private and public consumptions.
However, the welfare of agent a is not fully described by a; one also needs
to know the vector P a of as personal prices. Technically, the collective indirect
utility of a is:
V a (p; P; y; z) = va (p; P a; a (p; P; y; z))
which depends on both a and P a. This implies that the sole knowledge of the
GSR is not su¢ cient to recover the welfare level reached by a given agent, even
if her preferences are known; indeed, one also needs to know the prices, which
depend on all preferences.
In particular, welfare within the household cannot be analyzed from the sole
knowledge of the generalized sharing rule. Agents now face di¤erent personal
prices, and this should be taken into account. Of course, this conclusion was
expected; it simply reects a basic but crucial insight - namely that if agents
care di¤erentlyabout the public goods (as indicated by personal prices, which
reect individual marginal willingnesses to pay), then variations in the quantity
of these public goods have an impact on intrahousehold inequality.
3.2.3 The Money Metric Welfare Index
This leads us to the basic concept of Money Metric Welfare Index (MMWI) of
agent a. Formally:
Denition 6 The Money Metric Welfare Index (MMWI) of agent a, ma (p; P; y; z),
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is dened by:
va (p; P;ma (p; P; y; z)) = V a (p; P; y; z) (2)
Equivalently, if ca denotes the expenditure function of agent a;then:
ma (p; P; y; z) = ca (p; P; V a (p; P; y; z)) (3)
In words, ma is the monetary amount that agent a would need to reach
the utility level V a (p; P; y), if she was to pay the full price of each public good
(i.e., if she faced the price vector P instead of the personalized prices P a). The
basic intuition is simple enough. The index is dened as the monetary amount
that would be needed to reach the same utility level, at some reference prices; a
natural benchmark is to use the current market price for all goods, private and
public. Unlike the GSR, the Money Metric Welfare Index fully characterizes
the utility level reached by the agent. That is, knowing an agents preferences,
there is a one-to-one relationship between her utility and her MMWI, and this
relationship does not depend on the partners characteristics.
Three remarks can be made at this point. First, in the absence of public
goods, the MMWI coincides with the sharing rule. In other words, the MMWI
is a fully general measure of individual welfare, which coincides with the natural
concept (i.e. the sharing rule) in the (largely explored) case of private consump-
tions, and extends it to allow for public expenditures within the household.
A second remark is that in the presence of public goods, the MMWI depends
on the price vector for public goods used as a reference. While using the market
price as a benchmark is a natural solution, it is by no means the only one. Even
more striking is the fact that even the direction of intrahousehold inequality
may be a¤ected by this choice; i.e., one can easily construct examples in which





Price P’ > P
Figure 1: Fig 1: MMWIs for di¤erent reference prices
(see Figure 1).6
Lastly, there is a direct relationship between the MMWI and the standard
notion of equivalent income.7 Both approaches rely on the notion that refering
to a common price vector can facilitate interpersonal comparisons of welfare.
However, to the best of our knowledge, equivalent income has exclusively be
applied so far to private goods. Our point, here, is that using the concept
of Lindahl prices allows to extend it to the case of public comsumption, thus
providing a natural solution to a recurrent and somewhat di¢ cult problem.
3.3 An example
The previous concepts can be illustrated on a very simple example. Assume
two agents a and b, two commodities - one private q, one public Q - and Cobb-
6We thanks Frederic Vermeulen for suggesting this example.

















corresponding to the indirect utilities:
va = log y   
1 + 
logP   log (1 + ) + 
1 + 
log
vb = log y   
1 + 
logP   log (1 + ) + 
1 + 
log 
Let  be bs Pareto weight; then the couples consumption is given by:
qa =
1
(1 + ) (1 + )
y; qb =

(1 + ) (1 + )
y
and Q =
 (1 + ) +  (1 + )
(1 + ) (1 + ) (1 + )
y
P
generating utilities equal to:
V a = log y   
1 + 




 (1 + ) +  (1 + )
1 + 

V b = log y   
1 + 







 (1 + ) +  (1 + )
1 + 

In this context, straightforward calculations allow to see that:
1. The conditional sharing rule coincides with private consumption:
~a =
1
(1 + ) (1 + )
y; ~b =

(1 + ) (1 + )
y
2. Lindahl prices are
P a =
 (1 + )
 (1 + ) +  (1 + )
P
P b =
 (1 + )
 (1 + ) +  (1 + )
P
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3. The two MMWIs are given by:
ma =

 (1 + ) +  (1 + )






 (1 + ) +  (1 + )






 (1 + ) +  (1 + )






 (1 + ) +  (1 + )




Assume, now, that  = 1 but agents have di¤erent preferences for the public
good - say,  = 2 while  = :5; and let us analyze intrahousehold welfare using
three possible indicators.








and we conclude that member b is much better o¤ than a.
2. This conclusion is clearly unsatisfactory, because it disregards the fact
that half the budget is spent on the public good, which benets a more





and we conclude that for this indicator, the household is perfectly equal:
the benets of public expenditures exactly compensate di¤erences in pri-
vate consumptions.
3. The later conclusion is however too optimistic, since it omits the fact that
a paystwice as much for the public good than b does (here, P a = 23P
19
while P b = 13P ). Taking this last aspect into account, the respective
MMWIs are:
ma = :655y; mb = :72y
Again, b is better o¤ than a (although by much less than with the rst
measure). In addition, one may note that
ma +mb = 1: 375y
Individual MMWIs add up to more than total income, reecting the gain
generated by the publicness of one commodity.
4 Extensions
We now consider a few extensions of the model
4.1 Private goods with individual-specic prices
Interesting issues arise when, within the same household, individuals face di¤er-
ent prices for some good. A typical example is leisure: its (opportunity) price
is the wage, which is individual-specic. The previous approach applies in that
case as well. Specically, consider a standard, collective model of labor supply
with private consumption, as in Chiappori (1992). Individual utilities are of
the form ua (qa; La), where L denotes leisure and q is the consumption of some
Hicksian aggregate good. Let wa denote member as wage, y the households
(total) non labor income, and dene Y to be the household total (or potential)
income:




where T denotes total time available.
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E¢ ciency, in this context, is equivalent to a two stage process, in which
total income Y is split between members at the rst stage (so that member
a gets a, with
P
a 
a = Y ), and members each independently choose their
consumption and leisure bundle in a second stage, by maximizing ua under the
budget constraint:
pqa + waLa = a
Here as above, a natural measure of individual welfare is provided by the
sharing rule a. Unlike standard measures, which are based on consumption, the
sharing rule also considers leisure, the value of which is, as usual, estimated at
the persons current wage. This approach directly extends to non participation
by one spouse (or both). If member a does not work, then his/her leisure equals
total time available T , and is valued at its opportunity cost waT , where wa
is member as potential wage. Clearly, the notion thus dened requires the
(actual or potential) wage to be observable; for non working spouses, one may
have to estimate a potential wage, as a function of observable characteristics
(age, education,...) and correcting for possible selection biases.
While the practical implementation may raise specic di¢ culties, the concep-
tual background is largely straightforward. Welfare measures should be based
on total consumption, which includes consumption of leisure; and if the op-
portunity cost of leisure di¤ers across members, this should be reected in the
assessment. Note, however, that this logic may have surprising implications.
Consider a couple in which husband and wife have identical levels of leisure and
commodity consumption but di¤erent wages (say, his wage is higher). Then
our criterion concludes that the intrahousehold allocation is unequal in the hus-
bands favor, because, although the number of hours of leisure is the same, the
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value of his consumption of leisure is larger. This conclusion is, in a sense, un-
avoidable if one wants to consider a generalmeasure of consumption that also
includes leisure. Aggregating various consumptions requires relative prices, and
there is no compelling reason for not using market prices. But then the value
of one hour of leisure equals the persons wage; there is little justication for
departing from this benchmark.
It should however be noted that this approach may be seen as contradict-
ing the notion of equivalent income - which would require using the same price
(here wage) as a common benchmark. The contradiction, however, is largely su-
percial. Using the same reference wage for the husband and the wife is needed
only to the extent one considers male and female leisure as the same commod-
ity (which happens to be priced di¤erently depending on gender). While this
assumption may sometimes be acceptable (say, if both spouses have exactly the
same human capital and exert exactly the same task with the same productiv-
ity, so that the wage di¤erence is exclusively due to gender discrimination), one
would expect such cases to be the exception. Most of the time, husband and
wife have di¤erent jobs, and there would be little rationale to imposing these
jobs to be priced equally.
Finally, it is clear that the measure of welfare thus dened will be sensitive
to the denition of leisure. This raises two specic problems. One is the choice
of total available time T : a larger value of T inates the evaluation of time spent
on leisure, which increases total consumption of all members, but increases more
that of higher wage individuals. Second, and more important, is the issue of
domestic production. If, as seems natural, we include leisure in our assessment
of total consumption, then the distinction between trueleisure and other uses
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of available time (including chores and other forms of household production)
becomes crucial. This issue is considered below.
4.2 Changes in marital status
One of the main advantages of the collective approach, as opposed to unitary
models, is that it allows to model members preferences both within and outside
the relationship (say, before marriage or after divorce) within the same basic
framework. Still, an important question is the relationship between the two
sets of preferences. Various models make di¤erent assumptions on this issue.
One extreme version does not postulate any link between utilities when mar-
ried and single; hence, knowing an individual preferences when single brings
no information about her tastes whithin the household. On the other extreme,
some models assume that preferences are una¤ected by marital status, at least
ordinally. This means that if uaS (Q; q
a) denotes as utility when single, then her
utility when married takes the form:
ua (Q; qa) = F (uaS (Q; q
a))
where F is an increasing transform. Thus marriage can directly a¤ect a persons
utility level, but not the persons marginal rates of substitution between various
commodities. Note that if we assume preferences are una¤ected by marital
status, then the MMWI dened above has a natural interpretation; namely,
it is the level of income that would be needed by the individual, if single, to
reach the same utility level as what she currently gets within marriage. It must
however be stressed that the assumption of constant preferences across marital
status is not needed for the denition of the index, but only for this particular
interpretation.
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An intermediate approach, that relies on the notion of domestic produc-
tion, has recently been proposed by Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2003).
It posits that agents, when they get married, keep the same preferences but can
access a di¤erent (and generally more productive) technology. That is, while
the basic rates of substitution between consumed commodities remains unaf-
fected by marriage (or cohabitation), the relationship between purchases and
consumptions is not; therefore, the structure of demand, including for exclusive
commodities (consumed only by one member) is di¤erent from what it would be
for singles. More generally, one can, following Dunbar, Lewbel and Pendakur
(), only assume that preferences are una¤ected by family composition; e.g., that
parentspreferences regarding their own consumption does not depend on the
number of children. These approaches are described in the next subsection.
4.3 Domestic production
The general notion of domestic production covers a host of di¤erent situations.
Rural households typically have an explicit production activity, the outcomes
of which can be self consumed or sold on a market; in low income countries,
a large fraction of GDP consists of agricultural commodities produced at the
household (or the village) level. Even in high income economies, a signicant
fraction of individual available time is spent on household production. This
entails immediate tasks (cleaning, cooking, etc.) but also long term investments
in health, education and others. In a more abstract way, some authors, starting
with Beckers (1965) seminal contributions, have argued that most intrahouse-
hold activities, including consumption, can be modeled as entailing a production
component; even such commoditiesas love, a¤ection or mutual care are pro-
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duced (and consumed) at the household level. In Beckers model, actually,
the only commodities that are ultimately consumed by individuals are those
produced at the household level; goods purchased in the market are seen as
inputs in a production system that transforms these purchased goods into nal
commodities that are actually consumed (and enter individual utilities). These
home produced goods can be public or private. In what follow, we respectively
denoted by Qj and qai ; a = 1; :::;K; j = 1; :::; n the households consumption of
public good j and private good i by agent a.
The technology is described by a production function that gives the possible
vector of outputs (q;Q) that can be produced given a vector of market purchases
x (and possibly the time  = (a; a = 1;K) spent in household production by
each of the members). It takes the general form:
(q;Q) = f (x; ) (4)
while individual utilities are now Ua (qa; Q) for a = 1; :::;K.8
For clarity purposes, it is useful to start with case when all produced goods
are privately consumed within the household, then move to the general case.
4.3.1 Private goods only
We start with the case N = 0; moreover, we rst disregard the time spent
by each member on domestic production. This setting is thus identical to the
general model of household production of Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel
(2003).9 Pareto e¢ ciency translates into the program:
8The setting just described is identical to the general model of household production of
Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2003). For empirical applications, these authors use a linear
technology a la Barten.
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As before, this program can be decentralized, although decentralization now
requires specic (shadow) prices for the produced goods. Specically, let i; 





Let ((qa) ; a = 1; :::;K; x) denote the solutions, and dene the sharing rule by
a = 0qa
Then the program is equivalent to a two stage process, in which qa solves
maxua (qa)
under the budget constraint
0qa = a





















In that case, again, individual welfare is adequately measured by the sharing
rule.
Extending this model to domestic labor supply is straightforward. The
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i ) ; a = 1;K
Prices for internally produced goods are dened as before; the sharing rule
is now:
a = 0qa + waL
a; a = 1;K
where La denotes as optimal leisure. The program can be decentralized as












































qai ; i = 1; n
4.3.2 Private and public goods
We now consider the general case where produced goods can be private or public.




















As before, we may dene the shadow price of a produced good as the ratio
of the Lagrange multiplier of the corresponding production constraint to the
Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint. But decentralization now involves











Here, a is the Generalized Sharing Rule, and aj is as personal price for public




where j is the shadow price of public good j. Lastly, the MMWIs can be
dened as above; the denition (3) must simply be replaced with:
ma (p; P; y; z) = ca (;; V a (;; y; z)) (5)
Extending this formula to domestic time is straightforward.
5 Identication: some remarks
While the conceptual tools just presented help clarifying some of the issues in-
volved, their empirical content must be carefully considered: these is no point
putting much emphasis on a concept that cannot possibly be identied form
existing data. In fact, much progress has recently been made on these issues. In
this section, we briey summarize some of the main results. For a detailed pre-
sentation, the reader is referred to Chiappori and Ekeland (2009b) and Brown-
ing, Chiappori and Weiss (2014).
We start with the pure identication problem. Assume that the entire
demand function of a household can be observed; what can be recovered from
such data (and such data only)? A rst result, due to Chiappori and Ekeland
(2009a), is that under mild regularity conditions, one exclusion restriction per
agent is su¢ cient to fully identify the collective, indirect utilities. The exclusion
restriction, here, requires that for each agent there exists a least one commodity
that is not consumed by this agent. The result is local; in particular, it does
not require global constraints (such as non negativity restrictions). Moreover,
the presence of distribution factors would allow a stronger identication result.
Specically, the exclusion requirement can then be relaxed; one only need the
presence of an assignable commodity.10
10A good is assignable when it is consumed by all members and the consumption of each
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A crucial remark is that what is identied (up to an increasing transform) is
the indirect collective utility of each member. From a welfare perspective, this is
the only relevant concept, since it fully characterizes the utility reached by each
agent. However, its implications for the previous discussion must be carefully
considered. Paradoxically, the public good case is the easiest. Indeed, Chiappori
and Ekeland (2009a) show that when all commodities are publicly consumed,
recovering a persons indirect collective utility is equivalent to recovering their
direct utility. It follows that all the concepts previously dened (in particular
the MMWI) are exactly identied under either the exclusion condition or the
assignable and distribution factor case.
Private goods, however, raise specic di¢ culties. Remember that, in that
case, the various concepts (conditional sharing rule, generalized sharing rule,
money metric welfare index) coincide with the sharing rule, and the collective
indirect utility takes the form:
V a (p; y) = va (p; a (p; y))
where, as above, va is as indirect utility and  is the sharing rule. Under
assumptions stated above, the function V a is identied. The sharing rule, how-
ever, is not; identication only obtains up to an additive function of the prices
of the non exclusive goods. The corresponding indetermination is not welfare
relevant, since the di¤erent solutions correspond to the same collective indi-
rect utilities for each agent. In that case, and somewhat paradoxically, one can
identify intra-household welfare distribution (although only up to the usual re-
strictions: one can only identify individual utilities in an ordinal sense), but not
income distribution.
member is independently observed.
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It is crucial to remark, however, that this non identication result is only
local. In particular, it disregards additional, global restrictions such as non neg-
ativity contraints. If these are added, then more precise identication obtains.
For instance, adding a non negativity restriction exactly pins down the sharing
rule in general. This result should be related to recent work on the estimation
of the sharing rules based on a revealed preference approach (see for instance
Cherchye et al 2012). Since the revealed preference approach is global by nature,
it can generate bounds on the sharing rule, which can actually be quite narrow.
In all cases, the global restrictions are generated at one end of the distribution
of expenditures, so their use for identifying the sharing rule outside this range
should be submitted to the usual caution. Still, they tend to considerably reduce
the scope of the non identication conclusion.
Finally, additional assumptions may also help identication. The literature,
here, has followed two main directions. On the one hand, one may assume
that individual preferences remain (partly) unchanged after marriage. Then
information can be recovered from observing the demand of single individuals,
which allows full identication of the sharing rule even with private goods. This
line has been followed, for instance, by Bargain et al (2006), Vermeulen et al
(2006) and Lise and Seitz (2011) for labor supply, and by Browning, Chiappori
and Lewbel (2013) for consumption. Recently, Dunbar, Lewbel and Pendakur
(2012, 2014) have extended this approach by showing that, under additional
conditions on either preferences or the sharing rule (the so-called independence
of base, whereby the fraction of income going to each member does not depend
on total income), the requirements can be relaxed; what is needed is simply that
demand functions should be observed for families of di¤erent composition.
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A second line of research adopts an equilibrium approach. There constraints
on intrahousehold allocations are derived from the equilibrium conditions on the
marriage market. These approaches refer either to frictionless, matching mod-
els (Choo and Siow 2002; Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss 2009; Chiappori, Salanie
and Weiss 2013; Chiappori, Costa and Meghir 2014) or to a search framework
(Jacquemet and Robin 2013; Goussé 2013). In all these cases, complete identi-
cation of the sharing rule obtains.
6 Conclusion
In the paper, we propose a systematic view of issues related to welfare within
the household. We argue that any such analysis should be based on the notion
of individual welfare; i.e., it should consider the well-being of each individual
within the household. This raises conceptual and empirical di¢ culties. On
the conceptual side, the main issue is to account for the public nature of some
consumptions and for the presence of household production. We suggest that
the concept of Money Metric Welfare Index (MMWI), which can be viewed as
a generalization of the notion of equivalent income, is an adequate response to
these concerns. On the empirical side, while some (and possibly most) individual
consumptions are not observable, recent progress in the collective literature
allows one to actually recover these concepts from data on household behavior
under relatively mild conditions (typically exclusion restrictions for at least one
commodity per agent). All in all, the tools exist for shifting our perspective from
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